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A. Totalising Discoursea
Discourses on democracy in Africa have scripted a continent
turned upside down in a mere three years between 1989 and 1992.
Richard Dowden has written:
"Only a few years ago for an outsider to suggest that multi-
party democracy would be good for Africa was to risk being
labelled neo-colonialist. There was a consensus that Africa
was different and was developing its own forms of Democracy,
more suited to its history and culture". (Dowden, 1993; 607)
This interest in the re-democratisation in Africa has taken place
at a time when Mikhail Gorbachev and his successors have been
unscrambling the world that Joseph Stalin built. This internal
collapse was celebrated by the US State Department as the End of
History through one of its essayists, Francis Fukuyama. The essay
immediately attracted a lot of attention "because it seemed to
provide the ideological foundation for a new round of US
hegemony, the ideological gloss for a new American assert lveness"
[Pieterse; 1992; 91. The author's pedigree was impeccable in
terms of his association with state power. "We may interpret
Pukuyama as a mandarin in Chomsky's sense, as intellectual of the
state, with intellectual pretensions and closer to the national
security state that to a particular administration" Pieterse
added. Fukuyama held up the USA as a beacon of liberal freedom
to be emulated by all post-Cold War world. But this was no new
posture:
" Upholding the US as an example to the world is a motif as
old as the Pilgrim Fathers. 'Manifest Destiny' served this
purpose since the nineteenth century. In the 1950s during
the US 'rise to globalism' liberal democracy was held out
as America's guiding light, institutionalised as part of
American foreign policy and theorized as part of
modernisation theory. Now... it is dusted off and
reinstated... In this light Fukuyama's argument is a
perfectly conventional restatement of America's foreign
policy orthodoxy" [Pieterse, 1992; 111.
The teleology of Fukuyama's thesis celebrates the triumph of
liberal democracy. Disaggregating this incantation is called for.
First, liberalism. "In nineteenth-century Europe, liberalism and
colonialism developed alongside each other" writes Bikhu Parekh.
"With rare exceptions, liberals approves of colonialism and
provided it with a legitimising ideology" (Parekh, 1994; 111- At
the hands of J. S. Mill, the notion became Europeanised and
universalised. Only Europeans had attained the level of
possessive individualism. They were thus civilised, and had a
mission to spread this notion. Colonialism provided the
opportunity through which China, India, and Africa - the latter
a "continent without history" in Mill's words - could be
uplifted. As is known, Karl Marx shared these sentiments with
regard to the French colonization of Algeria and the British
conquest of India. Parekh continues: "Within the colonial
context, the Millan liberal is thus subject to two conflicting
demands. He justifies colonialism on the grounds that backward
societies need to be civilised and that only Europeans can do
this. He must therefore argue both that the liberal principals
are universally valid and that they are uniquely European in
their origin and inspiration". For the late twentieth century
substitute the West for Europe and Fukuyama for Mill and the End
of History thesis fits the mould. There is a further irony in
this: the Reaganite-Bush axis have had but contempt for
liberalism, their byte-word for Democratic Party people-oriented
policies during the past two decades. How come that what is
contemptible at home can be celebrated abroad?
But to return to Fukuyama. Given the centrality of the USA in his
thesis, the rhetorical question has been asked: Can the USA
promote democracy? According to Samuel P. Huntington as
summarised by Allison and Beschel the USA could contribute to
democratic development in several ways: "assisting economic
development of poor countries,- encouraging developing countries
to foster market economies and development of rigorous bourgeois
classes,- refurbishing the United States own economic, military,
and'political power so as to exercise greater influence than it
has in world affairs; and developing 'a concerted programme
designed to encourage and to help the elites of countries
entering the "transition zone" to lead their countries in a more
democratic direction' " [Allison and Beschel, 1992,- 86J .
For one more familiar with the hegemonic rhetoric of the West,
including those harbingers of the Third Colonial Occupation of
Africa, the World Bank and the IMF, the 'market economies',
'bourgeois classes', for Africa and USA 'exercising greater
influence' have a familiar imperialist ring. At any rate the two
Harvard professors advocate that the USA should continue on an
activist interventionist trajectory by outlining a series of
"DO'S" for their country:
" DO make American democracy a 'shining city on a hill'.
Western democracies must never forget that in the final
analysis it is the vitality of their values, institutions
and societies that will be the strongest argument for
democracy.
DO speed the transfer of the technological infrastructure
of pluralism to newly democratic and nondemocratic
societies: printing presses, photocopiers, personal
computers, fax machines, satellite dishes, and modern
telecommunications systems.
DO encourage the development of independent, civilian
analysis of military issues throughout newly democratic and
democratising countries.
DO encourage the development of independent universities and
research institutions to assume the responsibility of
educating the next generation in a timely fashion" [Allison
and Beschel, 1992, 90-97].
B. The nationalist Moment
The assumption of this conference is that the discipline of
History in Africa has so far not spoken to the 'global' agenda
of democratisation. Implicit in the invitation is the need for
the re-interrogation of African History, a production of an
African past that may be usable in the present and the many
possible futures. The central actor in this enterprise is
presumed to be the African historian, himself largely a product
of the decolonisation process [Vansina, 1992; Fage, 19931. The
evolution of the discipline and the making of the African
historian have to be seen as twin births. As recounted by one of
the founders:
"African history was really born on a specific date and its
parent was Prof. Phillips, then heading the School of
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), in London" (Vansina
1992; 77]
The African historians of the first generation arrived
academically with the doctorate and appointment of K.O. Dike to
faculty status in 1954 . As noted by Mudimbe and Jewsciewicki this
moment of arrival was simultaneously academic as well as
political [Jewsciewicki and Mudimbe, 1994] . For the generation
of B.A. Ogot and J.F.A. Ajayi the 1950s and 1960s were the years
of ' reintroducing the African man to the world' lOgot, 1967) . The
continent had hitherto been wilfully excluded from Judeo-
Christian historicity by western slavery and colonialism which
had established that Africans were people without history. The
process of the reintreduction thus involved the negation of this
Hegelian negation. It led Cheikh Anta Diop to stake claims to the
ancient Egyptian civilisations on behalf of black people
globally. Likewise it embodied B.A. Ogot to assert the anterior
validity of oral traditions as a source for African History,
indeed as the foundation resource for English history: Holinshed
and his predecessors had first utilised the domain of Orality
[Odhiambo, 1979] . The political moment of African independence
also called for the eclectic assertion of a glorious past: Africa
had always had empires and kingdoms, and even the clan-based
societies and moieties - The Tribes Without Rulers of yore - had
always had good government. An ordered past was thus asserted.
A glorious political future was promissory: "Seek ye first the
political Kingdom and all else will be added unto you" Nkrumah
allured. What remained, to be explained away, was the colonial
moment which Ajayi readily bracketed to have been merely an
episode in the long march in African history [Ajayi, 1965]. In
a recent clarification Ajayi has asserted that the emphasis of
his justly famous article was "on continuity and identity in
Africa, not the brevity or seeming impact of colonialism". The
author continues:
"I still believe in the continuity of Africa identity, but
I now emphasise that although slavery and colonialism do not
constitute the total definition of that identity, they have
made an impact on it to the extent of affecting the capacity
of the African for autonomous developments" [Ajayi,
1994:28].
Ajayi makes a further pertinent point with these words:
"While initially African scholars were able to play a
leading role, the elaboration of the new historiography has
been not only a multi-disciplinary project but also an
international one. The leadership of African scholars in
this historiography has not even remained assured...As in
the whole national movement itself, the educated elite stand
facing both ways" [Ajayi 1994:27].
In the context of this paper, the African historian is not likely
to bring fresh illuminations into discussion about democracy,
because hia primary concerns have largely with the reassertion
of our global humanity, and secondly with the articulation of the
usefulness of the historical past for the state hegemonic
project. To the latter now we turn.
The African historian of the 1960s was the intellectual
nationalist of the new state. The need for a history for the
state was taken as axiomatic. The relevance of history was
equally unproblematic: History was a resource to be used for
nation-building [Oloruntimhin, 1967] and for development [Were,
1983]. As Oirks has noted, "History has played a key role in the
modern production of the nation-state and of the various bases
of nationality, at the same time that the nation has played a
critical historical role in defining what a modern conception of
history should be" (Dirks, 1990:25]. In Africa decolonisation has
mandated the crafting of state histories: A History of Nigeria
[Isichei], A Modern Hintory of Tanganyika [Iliffe], A History of
Sierra Leone [Magbaily-FyleJ, A Modern History of Kenya
[Ochieng]. Bach of these states had to be given a nationalist
history of its precolonial past and of its freedom struggles.
Dirks continues, "The master narratives of nineteenth-century
history have been appropriated by the subjects of colonial rule".
Along this vein, he observes, "History has therefore been deeply
implicated both in hegemony and struggle". The Mau Mau debates
continually raging in Kenya testify to the fact of nationalist
history as constituting the site for struggles over the many
pasts of the Kenya state [Odhiambo, 1992]. However the overall
continental picture is a lot more benign. After three decades we
have ended with a discipline, African History, that is still an
annex of western historiography, "whiggish stories of national
self-determination and the unfolding of freedom" [Dirks, 1990].
In reviewing these efforts Jewsciewicki and Mudimbe have written:
"For years African historiography has been more sensitive to the
politics of Western academia than to the social and political
challenges faced by African societies" [1994:4] . They go further
to argue that African historians have been doing an uncritical
paste-job of linking a 'glorious past' to a 'radiant future'.
What has suffered is the history of the present, 'the myriad
ancient paths connecting the past to the present'. In the quest
to be western-scientific African historians have eliminated those
cultural peculiarities that would have made our indigenous
narratives truly autochthonic and not a sanitised version of the
Judeo-Christian western- universal. African historians have
tended to eliminate "magic, mythologies and the supposedly
irrational" from the gaze of history. The "cultural framework of
the present" has not been explicated in African terms. The
situation should tease contemporary historians to imagine the
possibilities of an African past unmediated by the midwifery of
western modernity.
C. AFRICAN KNOWLEDGE: AJALA'S BEADS
A recent historiographical essay by John Fage ends on this
salutary note:
"In the last analysis, it does need to be asked whether
European concepts of history are suitable for the
understanding of African history...It is possible, indeed,
to believe that the idea of history as we have come to know
it in modern Europe was not one to precolonial African
society" [Fage, 1993:24].
In the context of the concerns of this conference, the questions
raised via the statements by Fage need to be foregrounded. Has
the time come to question our unitary acceptance of the hegemonic
episteme which posits that the discipline of history uniquely
belongs to western civilisation? Alternatively, can Africans
articulate an African gnosis that stands independently of these
western traditions in our study in African history? Need African
epistemes be intelligible to the West? Need the study and
practice of African history be tied to the guild of historical
study at the university academies? Is there still the lingering
possibility that any one of us working within the western mode
can have the arterial intellectual bypass surgery that may still
be the viaduct upstream to the African reservoir of history?
Prof. Fage does not believe so.
"For the moment we have very little African history written by
Africans who are untainted by Buropean conceptions and the
significances of their own past," he writes. {In an intriguing
footnote to this statement Fage adds: "The example that
immediately comes to mind is the fascinating chapter, "The Living
Tradition" by A. Hampate Ba, UNESCO General History of Africa.
[Berkeley, 1981:1 166-203]. (But maybe Hampate Ba was more
resistant to Buropean culture than untainted by it)}. The fact
of this inescapable route of our professional training via the
colonial archive has been noted by philosophers working on
African material [Mudimbe 1988, 1992, Appiah 1992); indeed the
mastery of this western canon has been seen as constituting the
intellectual lifeline and survival kit of the Franco-African
scholar-philosopher Pauline Hountondji (D.B. Cruise 0'Brian,
1991) among others.
To home in, a series of questions relating to the discipline of
history are in order. What was the common African experience of
history? What common ideas of African history did the Bkici of
the Nineteenth century (before the Christian Missionaries made
Vorubas of them) share with their presumed Somaali cousins of
that era? What notions of power, authority, domination - and also
of democracy, participation, accountability and civil society -
did they share? Prom what common cultural universe were they
trapped? Could a post-Mfecane Sotho recognise Ajala's Heads as
a part of his cultural repertoire, imbued with the same meaning?
What are our ways of knowing all this, as historians?
And which historians? John Fage, cited above, teases us to think
of the possibility of its being markedly different from chat of
the western construct. Bven in name, the titles of the Journals
publishing African history articles signal us to the problematic
of translation. Is Europe's word History [ME < L historia < Gr.
learning by inquiry, narrative < history, knowing, learned < base
of eidenai, to know < IE Base* weis -, to see, know > wise] to
be translated as Hadith. Ngano.Kale Odu. Zamani. Mohlomi. as has
been the uncritical practice? Supposing there was no such
equivalents, no such meanings? A salutary parallel inquiry by
Louis Brenner alerts us to the complexity of this whole terrain:
"How do we analyse 'religion' in a society in which the
concept of 'religion' is absent? This question arises
because in the past most African languages did not include
a word which could be convincingly and unequivocally
translated as 'religion'. Such words exist now: New usages
which have been adopted and adapted under the influence of
Christianity or Islam: and of course, under the influence
of academic or theological discourse. But Historically
within Africa, those institutional and conceptual
distinctions which contemporary scholars might describe as
religious, political, economic or social, do not seem to
have existed. Nonetheless, most studies of African societies
treat 'religion' as an institutionally and conceptually
distinct category of analysis as if the author knew
precisely what it was, not only for himself, but for the
members of the societies under study as well. The result has
been that, consciously or not, external concepts have come
to define 'religion' in Africa.
The problem is not located so much in the process of
conceptualisation; after all, analysis requires a range of
clear concepts. The problem arises in distinguishing which
concepts properly belong to the analysis itself and which
to the object of analysis" [Brenner, 1989: 87]
Put in stark terms, how does one move from 'Yoruba' to 'Africa'?
What latitudes are to be permitted in this quantum and eclectic
leap? Professor Akinjogbin elided the issue in his inaugural
address by entering a special plea:
"What then did African think about history and its uses?
Because we have not yet arrived at a stage where the
philosophies of history as propounded by all African
societies can be meaningfully discussed, I shall attempt to
answer this question by taking my example of thoughts on
history among Africans from the Yoruba speaking peoples, who
have been my special area of study for the last twenty
years. When we remember that the Yoruba and their related
peoples are to be found, as indigenous populations and in
large and influential numbers in four modern West African
states, then it will be realised that they constitute a very
important portion of Africans inhabiting the West African
forest region, and that a study of their thoughts on history
pervades a large portion of the African continent"
lAkinjogbin, 1977: 9).
This is indeed a calculated move, a plea for permission to
generalise from the particular specifics of Yoruba experience.
The Yoruba have a category of knowledge, itan knowledge derived
from human actions or from actions which human eyes can observe,
including all the applied sciences, are classified as History
(Itan) (1977:10).
"Itan for the Yoruba included what we should now regard as
Law, Political Science, Philosophy, Literature...The Yoruba
believe that...a good acquaintance with history bestows
oqbon...roughly translated as wisdom".
Thus forewarned, the argument for the Yoruba view of history was
then more encompassingly stated:
"Let us look a little bit more closely at how Yoruba viewed
history. For the Yoruba, Itan is anything /observed and
remembered about the actions, voluntary and involuntary, of
human beings as well as of his natural environments. Thus
itan, history, is not just a record of human actions, not
just as human beings do. The development of all living
objects constitutes history for the Yoruba mind as long as
such a development is remembered by human beings. Thus when
the Yoruba say "igi ti o ba ci oju eni hu, ko le wo pa ni"
(a tree that grew under one's observation, cannot crush
one) , they are not denying that the volume or mass or weight
of such a tree could be lethal if it fell on one. Rather
they are saying that the tree has a history which will be
so well known, that one will be able to take precautions
against its eventual fall. Or when the Yoruba say "a kii mo
oruko iku, ki iku o pa 'ni, a kii mo oruko arun ki aun so
ni lojo" (if one knows the name of death, death does not
kill one prematurely, and if one knows the name of disease,
it does not confine one) they are saying that death and
diseases have their histories which, once known, aid
prevention and cure. In other words, inanimate things like
trees and diseases also have their histories which, when
remembered by human beings, lend them to easier
manipulation. This definition of history by the Yoruba is
very wide, but it will be agreed that it is very modern, for
current approaches to the study of natural phenomena to be
harnessed for human use are tending to be historical. Modern
scientists are seeking to know the histories and
characteristics of these phenomena in order to be able to
manipulate them".
The argument further proceeds:
"Not only have the Yoruba defined history they have also
have thought about the nature of history. From the example
of the Ifa verse...one would gain the impression that the
Yoruba believed that history repeats itself. . .In other words
Ifa tends to show that the same events repeat themselves and
can serve as guide to solutions of present problems.
Similar to this view of history is the Yoruba saying 'Aiye
nre ibi aaro' [the world is going back to the morning
period] . Here history is seen in terms of the natural
phenomena of day with its morning, afternoon and evening or
night periods. This looks like the cyclical view of
history...There is however another saying which shows that
the Yoruba also saw history as continuous. 'Aiye nlo a nto
o' [The world is moving and we are following) . . .there is the
implication here that history is continuous, very similar
to Arnold Toynbee's view of history being a seamless
garment...These examples should caution us against thinking
that the Yoruba had a monolithic view of the nature of
history.
Just as the Yoruba had thought about the nature of history,
so they had also pondered upon its uses. Foremost among the
advantages which the study of history was believed to confer
is ogbon [wisdom]. We commonly hear people say that the
only lesson of history is that nobody learns from history.
This is a view the Yoruba did not accept. To them a person
who did not or could not learn from history was, not just
an ego [fool] but an omugo [ie. someone who makes
foolishness his constant drink]. To show how highly the
Yoruba regarded knowledge of history, Orunmila the epitome
of knowledge and wisdom in Yoruba cosmology, is called
epitan ale Ife [the historian of Ife land]. The implication
here is that Orunmila's wisdom is derived at least in part
from his knowledge of history" [Akinjogbin, 1977: 11-12].
Prof. Akinjogbin's theses justly deserve extensive quotation
because they are definitive and prescriptive: they define history
as part of knowledge and its usage as being the pursuit of wisdom
from which may be derived an appropriate present. They also
expose the very wide distance between western history and the
Yoruba concept of reality. They also alert us to the possibility
that the Yoruba may not necessarily inhabit the same universe of
reality as their equally robust nemesis, the Luo of the river-
lake regions of eastern Africa. On the other hand they may. The
point is that one must not just glide from Ife to Pubungu, the
respective cradlelands of the Yoruba and Luo. Nor from either
simply to Africa. The totalizing extrapolation skips over a
necessary middle. There is a need for surveillance lest we
unwittingly perpetuate the hegemonic myth of African sameness.
The above discussion foregrounds the problems inherent in making
continental inferences from regional visibilities. Condensation
can also lead to aggregation. The most visible of such hegemonic
enterprises lately has been The ONKSCO General History of Africa
.project, of which Vansina has written:
"With regard to African History, to my-mind at least, GHA
has been the most impressive venture of this century, not
only because of its size or complexity, but because it
involved authors from the most diverse origins and belonging
to all the schools of thought then active in international
academic circles" [Vansina, 1993: 350].
This global project itself invites surveillance in the context
of the conference agenda. The language of discourse about power
and authority, control and domination, conquest and rule, dissent
and suppression, rebellion and destruction or flight, resonates
throughout the volumes covering the Africa of pre-colonial times.
One can hardly squeeze out democracy, human rights, personal
freedom, transparency and accountability out of these volumes.
They are in reality about imperial, kingly, priestly and military
prowess. The chapters do not unveil the politics of participation
between kings and commoners, between the Sarautas and the
Takalawas, between the Wangwana and the Washenzi of Mombasa.
Where does one begin to search for democratic traits in this
narrative of the victors and the vanquished?
D. THE MAOISM) PAST
One way of reading Things Fall Apart by Chinua Achebe is to
interpret it as representation: a presentation of a possible past
and a performance of the idiom of political democracy in Umuofia.
It is possible then to read uniformity in Umuofia, Mbaino and
Mbanta although the author insists on diversity as the typical
characteristic. One such reading offers this celebration:
"What is remarkable about the Igbos is the degree to which
they have achieved the foundations of what most people seek
today - democratic institutions, tolerance of other
cultures, a balance between male and female principles,
capacity to change for the better or to meet new
circumstances, a means of redistributing wealth, support for
industriousness, a viable system of morality, an effective
system of justice...Achebe appears to have tested Igbo
culture against the goals of modern liberal democracy and
to have set out to show how the Igbo met those standards"
[Rhoads, 1993: 61].
This reading resonates well with the colonial archive which duly
noted and canonized the notion of Igbo receptivity to change. It
also delineates and reaffirms the Protestant Bthic that was
seemingly inherent in Okonkwo [but not in his father Unokol.
Rhoads further argues: "Achebe emphasises certain basic political
institutions which might form the foundation of a modern African
state. Igbo gerontocracy provided the encompassing umbrella.
"For great decisions the ndichie, or elders gather together
all of Umuofia.. .The clan rules all, and the collective will
of the clan can be established only by the group. Further,
as is appropriate for and in a democracy, each amn is judged
on his own merits, 'according to his worth', not those of
his father, as would be appropriate in an aristocracy or an
oligarchy" [Rhoads, 1993: 63].
The lineage of this discourse is distinctly modern: JJ Rousseau
and JS Mill would recognize the simulcrum of democracy in early
twentieth-century Umuofia with utmost ease. Yet the nagging
question still has to be: how could one remodel the contemporary
scene in Anambra or Imo state, or more ambitiously all of chaotic
Nigeria from one Umuofia writ large? In what ways .would the Igbo
world of the novelist Acebe become the precursor for the post-
colonial state, beyond the current aphoristic prism for seeing
states and nations as imagined communities?
There is an alternative view of village societies that regards
them as no less restrictive than aristocracies or oligarchies.
Summarising a large body of literature Gellner has stated as
follows:
"...agrarian man has the option of being dominated either
by kings or by cousins...The system of social positions to
which he is so closely tied will generally use kin
terminology, and social units will consist of real or
fictive kinsmen. So very roughly, the price of being able
to resist kings is to be tied very firmly to cousins. You
can escape one or the other, but not both, though you can
of course be yoked to both. In fact, the typical agrarian
polity does combine these elements" (Gellner, 1991: 500].
Gellner adds that modern man, in desiring civil society, wishes
to be free of tyrannical state rule "but not at the cost of
falling into the hands of the cousins" whose sole wish is indeed
to impose an 'incessant anthropology' [Cohen and Odhiambo, 1989:
54; 1992: 66-67) of demands, obligations and extraction on their
petty-bourgeois and bourgeois kin. An equalitarian, communocratic
village democracy must be part of that idyllic past politically
constructed by the likes of Julius Nyerere in the 1960s the more
to control and extract taxes and tribute from African
peasantries.
But the assumption that there is some residual democracy that can
be salvaged from African 'traditions' dies hard. Maxwell Owusu
has most recently argued that there is a 'vibrant' strand in
African political traditions directly relevant to
democrat isat ion,'
"...namely the set of 'leadership norms' often enshrined in
oaths, song and drum texts, maxims and proverbs, prayers and
ceremonies, which gave shape to the rival 'principle of
equality' or equal potentiality to authority ['the king in
every man') constituting what I have referred to as
fiduciary obligation of trusteeship, subordinating the
wielders of political power to 'constitutional law' and
checks and balances. These principles conversely established
the 'right' and duty of the subjects to disobey and even
kill an autocratic tyrannical ruler" (Owusu, 1994: 32-33).
Owusu's advocacy relies on the fact that Akan chieftaincies and
close-knit family syBtems have enabled the citizens of Ghana to
weather the caprices of the recurrent military dictatorships over
the last three decades. Yet the problem lies precisely here: how
does one transfer these village-democratic values above the heads
of Jerry Rawlings and the cheeky Chikata brothers to establish
and routinize them at the centre of state power? Why have these
values not restrained the military? Indeed how come that Rawlings
and the bandit-President Yoweri Museveni have lasted so long
amidst the historic Akan and Kitara complexes?
Part of the answer lies in an alternative tradition of power that
has flourished directly out of the right to rebellion that Owusu
applauds. Blaewhere I have argued that the right to kill the king
and seize the throne - the Kyebambe tradition - has itself become
a permanent fixture in the eastern African kingdoms:
•Between the fifteenth and the eighteenth centuries the
successor states to Kitara invented the Kyebambe Tradition:
the right to revolt and kill the' reigning monarch, and
proclaim oneself as his rightful successor through the
vanquishing of the dead king's followers. The Kyebambe
tradition remains Uganda's most durable tradition...The
pursuit of power for its own sake has brought into practice
the Kyebambe tradition, a whole line of personalities and
names, with titles for themselves and kingdoms on the march,
traversing the terrain..." [Odhiambo, 1989: 12,17).
Botswana haB lately been flaunted by the experts as the one
exception that proves the rule of continuity and change and a
veritable model for the workings of a modernized and democratic
polity. Thus one author states:
"Botswana is the only African country that has managed to
transform its colonial heritage into a viable democracy
without first passing through a period of authoritarian
rule, mainly as the result of wise political leadership and
a large measure of good fortune. The Batswana proceeded
modestly and prudently, blending the traditional and the
modern in a pragmatic way. Although the Tswana chiefs play
a very secondary role in the central regime, they remain
respected and influential at the local level. They continue
to dispense justice and arbitrate civil disputes in their
traditional courts...They operate in tandem with elected
district councils, which are responsible for local
government activities..." [Landell-Mills, 1992:544).
Our critique of this fascination with Botswana is specific: the
institutions herein described are not the Tswana traditions of
the 18308, but very much colonial social apparatuses. Secondly
the discourses are loud on chiefly authority but muted on the
questions of people's participation and liberal democracy.
Thirdly the premises for this Tswana success are rather
capricious. In Landell-Mill's words the success has been "mainly
as the result of good leadership and a large measure of good
fortune". These are precisely the variables that have proved
volatile continentally, that need to be programmatized and
domesticated. They do not at any event rise out of the well-
springs of the ordinary lived-in experiences, and cannot be
replicated as such. THAT THE TSWANA ARE ALMOST THBRB BBCAUSE THEY
ARE LUCKY cannot be a necessary and sufficient lesson of history.
K. THE FDTDU PRESENT AMD THE ABOSKS OF THE PAST
The most agonizing historical conjuncture obtains today in
AZANIA, particularly in KwaZulu where history of a certain
African type is being played up and out as if to underscore its
banal relevance and persistent perversity. The Zulu nationalist
Mangosuthu Buthelezi has in the past two decades made his
versions of the Zulu past the centrepieces for his struggles for
the present and the future. In a recent article Patrich Harries
outlines the dimensions of these tragic usages of the past
[Harries 1993]. Harries depicts the nature of Zulu identity in
the Nineteenth Century as having been based on a set of cultural
markers defined by the royal family. Following the destruction
of the Zulu Kingdom, there arose a generation of Zulu modernizers
who utilized identity as a resource for negotiating and
establishing a niche as a petty-bourgeoisie in the emergent
industrial world of the 1920s and 1930s. These mission educated
'new men' rallied around the Zulu language, which served as a
bridge linking them to the emergent proletariat and the landless
masses. They also fell back on the imagery of the Zulu king.
Harries writes:
"The Zulu king was perceived as a crucial symbol, linking
the people north and south of the Tugela in a new, yet
historical, Zulu community. By portraying the king and the Zulu
language as traditional symbols that bound Zulu-speakers within
a new and expanded political space, the petty-bourgeoisie was
able to unite the disparate communities into the most powerful
ethnic alliance in South Africa. At the grassroots level this new
concept of the tribe provided people, uprooted and disorientated
by colonialism, with a means of reasserting patriarchal and
tribal controls...what is equally clear is that while Zulu
symbolism was traditional, its content was decidedly modern. By
looking at the imagery of the old kingdom the petty-bourgeoisie
sought to unite traditionalists and modernizers; to reinforce the
space that they had defined, they encouraged a belief in a shared
past" [Harries, 1993:112].
The apartheid regime facilitated this new 'tribalism' by
providing it with a homeground in a Bantustan, Kwaszulu, in 1970.
Prom this fastness Buthelezi has been speaking of history, of a
history that is meticulous in its appropriation of the western
canon:
"One of the ways in which he has mobilized a regional
support base has been through his recourse to the
legitimising power of history and tradition. Buthelezi
expresses a strong admiration for the didactic and ocular
virtues of Kleio. He has a developed sense of history and
in his public speeches he has made reference to virtually
every major historian who has written on the Zulu. It is not
unusual for him to quote an entire dispatch buries in the
London P.R.O., an extract of a nineteenth-century newspaper,
or a modern doctoral thesis. He views history as a tool for
understanding the present and peppers his speeches with 'I
have learnt from history', 'as a historian', and 'we must
learn the lesson of history'. In his speeches history takes
on a life and dynamism of its own as it 'demands', 'lends',
'decrees', 'forges', 'infuses', 'shapes', 'creates',
'screams', 'shows', 'makes', and particularly 'teaches'.
Buthelezi draws numerous parallels between past and present
events" [Harries, 1993: 114].
What that history to inculcate among other things is the parallel
between the 19th century Shaka state and the present Inkatha
state,- the direct linkage between imperial conquest and nation-
building then and now. It also appropriates the wider nationalist
and teleological view of the state embraced by the Africanist
historians of the 1960s. This line legitimises the Buthelezi
project: African heroism, valour and capacity for state-building
was the stuff from which national histories have been written in
the past three decades. The hegemonic project of Gatsha Buthelezi
affirms the possibilities of using and abusing the past in
agrarious ways.
Odhiambo: Democracy _ Apr. 26-29
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